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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the thesis is to draw attention to the significance of the individual opinions in 
the practice of the International Court of Justice. The author aims to define the actual role of 
individual opinions in the system of work of the International Court of Justice by means of 
analyses of individual opinions appended to the Court’s judgements, rendered under 
contentious and advisory jurisdiction of the Court. In this thesis possible solutions proposed 
of how the existence of individual opinions should be regulated in the basic documents of the 
International Court of Justice.  
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SUMMARY 
The purpose of the thesis “Separate and dissenting opinions: their role in the practice of the 
ICJ” is to addresses the problem of the actual place of the individual opinions in the system of 
work of the International Court of Justice and to propose possible solutions to the problem of 
how the existence of individual opinions should be regulated in the basic documents of the 
International Court of Justice.  
The introduction of the thesis determines the aims of the present research and briefly defines 
the directions of the existing discussions in academic community and amongst the judges of 
the International Court of Justice about the place of the system of individual opinions in the 
practice of the Court. 
The first chapter of the thesis provides for a general purpose and functions of the system of 
individual opinions in the light of the historical overview of how the right to deliver 
individual opinion was included in the Statute of the Court. The main terms, types of 
individual opinions and the problem of limitation of the scope of individual opinions are 
examined in the chapter. 
The second chapter identifies the disputable aspects of the role of individual opinions in the 
practice of the Court. Two main arguments against the existence of individual opinions as a 
judge’s statutory right in the International Court of Justice are examined: the publication of 
individual opinions and the influence of individual opinions on the authority of the court. The 
purpose of this chapter is to identify possible practical correlation between the publication of 
individual opinions and possible diminishment of the authority of the Court. 
The third chapter consists the analysis of the positive aspects of the existence of the system of 
individual opinions in the work of the Court. The function of the system of individual 
opinions to be a source for interpretation or elucidation of a judgement of the Court is 
evaluated in this chapter. The hypothesis is proposed and discussed that individual opinions 
are the part of a judgement of the Court. Also, the actual role of the individual opinions in the 
development of international law is analyzed in this chapter. The author proposes the 
hypothesis of the existence of a phenomenon of “jurisprudence of individual opinions” which 
functions separately from the jurisprudence of the Court. 
The last part of the research formulates conclusions of the thesis and provides proposals for 
possible solutions to problems indicated in the research and recommendations for possible 
future research. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The question on individual pronouncements in the collective courts is difficult and much 
debated. The continental system of law and the anglo-saxon system of law have opposite 
approaches to the solution of the problem of dissent. The International Court of Justice, which 
is composed of judges from different legal system has created its unique practice in respect to 
individual opinions. Although the system of individual opinions has been implemented in the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice almost a century ago it still seems to be unsettled. 
The judges of the International Court of Justice have a statutory right to express their opinion 
in a form of dissenting or separate opinion if they do not agree with the majority decision. The 
judges of the Court make use of this right frequently. There is only one judgement in the 
practice of the International Court of Justice that has no individual opinions appended to it.
1
 
Even when the decision of the Court in a particular case is unanimous, there are judges who 
deliver their separate opinions.  
However, the duration of the existence and the frequency of usage has not added much 
authority to individual opinions. The discussions on the utility of individual opinions and on 
the desirable prohibition of these opinions are still remained open in academic community. 
Moreover, there is a significant disagreement about the future destiny of individual opinions 
between the judges of the International Court of Justice.  
The opponents of the system of individual opinions claim that this system has negative effect 
on the work of the Court in two main aspects. The first aspect is the secrecy of deliberations 
of the Court. The rule on the secrecy of deliberations is provided by the Statute of the Court 
and is one of the cornerstones of the authority of the Court and independence of judges. The 
second aspect is the authority of the Court in general, which is deemed to be compromised by 
the publication of separate and, especially, dissenting opinions. In the view of the opponents 
of the system of individual opinions the authority of the Court naturally rests on the 
anonymous unanimous decision.  
The supporters of the system of individual opinions state that without this system it is hard to 
imagine a progressive development of international law, that individual opinions guarantee 
the independence and personal responsibility of a judge and increase the quality of the 
majority decision.  
The existing studies of the individual opinions in the practice of the International Court of 
Justice tend to propose three types of solutions to the problem. The typical proposal is to 
abolish individual opinions in the practice of the International Court of Justice and to establish 
a rule of the anonymous unanimous decision. The second typical proposal is to prohibit the 
publication of individual opinions. And the third typical proposal is to maintain the existing 
system of individual opinions with increasing the level of transparency of the process of 
deliberations of the Court.     
The aims of the thesis are to identify the actual role of the system of the individual opinions 
in the practice of the International Court of Justice and, consequently, to propose possible 
solutions of strengthening the positive effect that this system has on the work of the 
International Court of Justice. 
                                                 
1
 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2009 (Feb.3), p. 61. 
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In order to reach the purpose of the research it is important to raise the questions: 
1. What are the practical and theoretical reasons for the divergent attitude towards the 
system of the individual opinions amongst the scholars and the judges of the 
International Court of Justice? 
2.  Is there a correlation between the existence of the system of individual opinions and 
the diminishment of the Court’s authority? 
3. Do individual opinions in practice of the International Court of Justice contribute to 
the progressive development of international law? 
4. What are the possible proposals on how to regulate the system of individual opinions 
in the basic documents of the International Court of Justice? 
The present research is based on both, primary and secondary sources of law. The primary 
sources of law include international conventions, the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The secondary 
sources include judgements of the Permanent Court of International Justice and individual 
opinions appended to them, judgements, advisory opinions, orders of the International Court 
of Justice and individual opinions appended to these documents, academic literature, which 
include books and academic articles, and the official publications of the International Court of 
Justice. 
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2 THE CONCEPT OF INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1 General purpose and function of individual opinions 
A decision-making process in the work of collegiate courts implies that judges who make up 
the court do not necessarily have to have the same opinion about the case which was referred 
to it. It is natural that important cases bring disagreements even amongst judges in final 
instance in national courts as well as in international adjudication. There is, however, an 
unanimously accepted conception that a judgement in a collegiate court is not merely the 
collection of individual opinions on the merits of the case in question made by the most 
respected jurists in the particular community but a collective decision of the court as an entity. 
This may lead to the conclusion that a collegiate court as a body should produce a single 
decision that represents the final judgement on the case giving no room for any doubts that 
there could be another opinion inside the court. Although it does not seem mutually exclusive 
that different opinions on the given case may exist in a collegiate court, and the court might 
still act as a collective, several questions remain. It is not clear whether these different 
opinions should take any legal form and whether they should be disclosed to the general 
public, or whether the secrecy of private deliberations of the court should be guaranteed.  
It has taken many debates before the provisions on individual opinions were adopted it in the 
basic documents of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Adoption of these provisions 
and consequent practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor - the 
International Court of Justice, raised questions on how judges are able to use above-
mentioned provisions in compliance with the spirit and letter of the Statute of the Permanent 
Court of Justice and of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  
The tradition of judicial dissent belongs to common law system of courts. However, based on 
the documents on the preparation to the establishment of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, the predecessor of the International Court of Justice, it is justified to assume that 
preconditions to guarantee a judge’s statutory right to express an individual opinion in 
international adjudication can be traced back to international arbitration. 1899 Convention for 
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in Article 52
2
 gave members of the Tribunal a 
truncated right to dissent without explanation of their reasons. 1907 Convention suppressed 
the right of expressing individual opinions simply stating in Article 79 “The Award must give 
the reasons on which it is based. It contains the names of the Arbitrators; it is signed by the 
President and Registrar or by the Secretary acting as Registrar.”3 The practice was, in other 
words, inconsistent.   
The Council of the League of Nations appointed The Advisory Committee of Jurists to submit 
a draft of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.  The analysis of acts and 
documents concerning the organization of the Permanent Court of International Justice shows 
that intense deliberations and debates took place amongst the members of The Advisory 
Committee of Jurists and then amongst the members of the Court while considering the 
                                                 
2
 E. Dumbauld, “Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
and American Law Register 90 (8) (1942): p. 941. 
3
 R.P. Anand, “The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication” The International 
Comparative Law Quarterly 14, no.3 (1965): p. 795. 
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questions whether individual judges should be allowed to express their views and to explain 
publicly why they voted against the opinion or judgement of the majority of the Court.  
In the course of the preparation of the Rules of the Court in 1922
4
 there were no significant 
debates on the provision of the Rules regarding delivery of a separate opinion, but a question 
was raised whether it was possible to file a dissenting opinion when the Court exercises its 
advisory jurisdiction. The argument against such a possibility was that the existence of 
dissenting opinions could undermine the Court’s moral authority of advisory opinions as its 
advisory opinions have no binding effect. Also, it would make no sense to apply to the Court 
for an advisory opinion if the Court’s official opinion might consist of several divergent 
opinions on the question.  Nevertheless, the Rules of the Court adopted on March 24,1922 in 
Article 62 and Article 71 permitted dissenting judges to append their opinions
5
 both in cases 
of contentious and advisory jurisdiction. However, the revision of the Rules of the Court in 
1926
6
 reopened the well-argued discussions about the permitting dissenting opinions and in 
what form these should be made. The provisions on dissenting opinions were, however, 
included in the Statute of the Court at that time. President Loder expressed his negative 
attitude towards dissenting opinions in general. He referred to the fact that the Court was 
established under the continental conception implying that the Court should act as a 
collective. He also questioned the authority of the Court to include in the Rules of Court the 
provision on dissenting opinions under advisory jurisdiction. 
7
 M. Anzilotti stated that “the 
principle of dissenting opinions was a fundamental principle of the Statute.”8 M. Oda, on the 
one hand, explained his position against publication of dissenting opinions with the concern 
that such publication might lead to dependence of national judges on their government. On 
the other hand, he insisted that as the principle of dissenting opinions has been already 
established and implemented in the practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice it 
would be wrong to change the accepted order.
9
 After long deliberations the Court decided to 
follow the previous practice by eight votes to three. Accordingly, the Statute of the Court and 
the revised Rules of the Court amended on July 31, 1926
10
 gave judges the flexibility in the 
choice of form of dissent in contentious and advisory jurisdiction. Article 71 of the revised 
Rules stated that: 
Dissenting judges may, if they so desire, attach to the opinion of the Court either an 
exposition of their individual opinion or the statement of their dissent.
11
  
In the course of the debates which are mentioned above another important issue was 
discussed. The issue refers to functions of individual opinions. It was stated that the disclosure 
                                                 
4
 International Court of Justice. Rules of Court (adopted March 24, 1922) Available on: https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_D/D_01.pdf accessed May 20, 2019.  
5
 Ibid. 
6
 International Court of Justice. Statute and Rules of the Court, First Edition, Series D. №.1, 1926 Available on: 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_D/D_01_1e_edition.pdf Accessed 
May 20, 2019. 
7
 International Court of Justice. Acts and documents concerning the Organization of the Court. Series D 
Addendum to No.2, 1926, p. 195 Available on: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-
justice/serie_D/D_02_acts_and_doc_serie_d_add_to_n2.pdf Accessed May 20, 2019. 
8
 Ibid. p. 196. 
9
 Ibid. p.197. 
10
 Supra note 6. 
11
 Supra note 6. 
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of dissenting opinions is directly linked to the Court’s policy of openness and publicity. This 
policy both strengthens the authority of the Court and develops the principle of individual 
responsibility of judges 
12
. Thus, it can be deducted that since the establishment of the Court 
the role of individual opinions was understood to be broader than simply to serve as an 
instrument for judges to defend their position on voting.     
The question on dissenting opinions was raised again in the work of the Committee of Jurists 
on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1929. M. Formageot was 
strongly convinced that the practice of the Court to disclose the existence of different opinions 
on a pending case should be suppressed. He insisted that such a disclosure increased the 
influence of governments to the national judge, regardless of whether the disclosure was done 
only by indication of the fact that there was dissent in the case or by appending the statement 
of dissent to the judgment with an explanation of the reasons of the dissenting judge. The 
proposal was made to eliminate any form of the publicity of dissenting opinions and to render 
a judgment solely in the name of the Court.
13
 It is interesting that the Committee had never 
discussed the possibility of anonymous individual opinions as a mean of suppression of 
influence of governments on the national judge. One of the concerns of the members of the 
Committee about the aforesaid proposal of M. Formageot was that countries from the Anglo-
Saxon legal system might withdraw from the Court, because the existence and disclosure of 
individual opinions is one of the fundamental principles of legal tradition in those countries. 
However, the substantive reason for keeping the system of publicity of individual opinions 
was that:  
The duty of the Court was not merely to settle disputes brought before it. It should 
establish a jurisprudence based only on the opinions of the judges.
14
  
As a result of such reasoning and due to the fact that the majority of the Court defended the 
system of dissenting opinions, the provisions of the Statute and the Rules on dissenting 
opinions were saved.  
Nevertheless, the very existence of the discussions on dissenting opinions which occurred 
almost in every elaboration of the Statute or the Rules shows that there are strong divergent 
opinions on how to keep the balance between the Court’s principle of publicity and the desire 
to strengthen its authority as the main body of international adjudication. A fundamental 
principle has emerged out of the debates on dissenting opinions. It is that the publicity of the 
Court is a cornerstone of the authority of the Court. It is impossible to build a the hierarchy 
between the principle of publicity and the authority of the Court for the reason that these 
concepts are inseparable. The correlation between two concepts is that publicity increases the 
authority.      
Although, there is still no consensus amongst members of the scientific and professional legal 
community on the reasons for the emergence of individual opinions, their content and style, 
there is a general understanding that it is impossible to deny a certain influence of individual 
opinions both on the judgments of the Court and on the Court as a body.  
                                                 
12
 Supra note 7, p. 200. 
13
 International Court of Justice. Committee of Jurists on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, Minutes, 1929, p.50 Available on: https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-
justice/serie_D/D_minutes_statut_PCIJ_11au19march_1929.pdf Accessed May 20, 2019. 
14
 Supra note 13, p. 51. 
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There is an opinion that “The negative side of a dissenting opinion is more prominent and the 
positive side less in evidence in international than in national jurisprudence.” 15  As was 
already mentioned, one of the arguments against individual opinions is the loss of the 
authority of the Court when the absence of a common position amongst judges becomes 
publicly acknowledged. There is a fear that a judgement made by a minimum majority 
accompanied by detailed, meaningful and well-reasoned individual opinions diminishes the 
authority of the Court as a body. The consequence of diminished authority might be the 
decrease of the confidence of states in the Court’s power to render binding decisions. 
Although judgments delivered by the Court are legally binding, the question is raised by the 
opponents of the system of dissenting opinions is whether a judgment made by a minimum 
majority still has a morally binding effect. The opponents of the system of dissenting opinions 
usually consider individual opinions as a criticism of the judgement, in their view the 
awareness of the public about the existence of a dissenter amongst the members of the Court 
“may weaken the authority of the majority pronouncements and detract from the dignity of 
the Court.”16  
It is said that the purpose of the existence of any phenomenon can be determined through its 
functions. In order to determine the value of individual opinions and their role in the 
jurisprudence of the Court it is necessary to define the functions of individual opinions. For 
the first time particular functions of individual opinions have been defined in the course of the 
deliberations of Committee of Jurists on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1929. It was stated that publication of dissenting opinions would lead to a more 
thorough examination by the Court of all different arguments made by the dissenters. Also, 
the Committee noted that publication of dissenting opinions increases the quality of the 
judgement itself. It makes the Court to state the reasons in the judgment clearly. Furthermore, 
it was admitted that system of dissenting opinions significantly decreases possibility of any 
political considerations that might affect the judgement.
17
   
Thus, it can be concluded that individual opinions have several important positive functions 
such as: 
 improvement of style and arguments of the judgement of the Court; 
 strengthen the authority of the Court as the party which lost the case may find 
arguments in its favor in individual opinions. This confirms that the arguments of the 
losing party were reviewed by the Court and were convincing at least for the minority; 
 individual opinions can be considered as one of the safeguards of the principle of 
independence of judges; 
 individual opinions can be a source for interpretation or elucidation of the judgement 
of the Court. 
                                                 
15
 E. Hambro, “Dissenting and Individual Opinions in the International Court of Justice" Zeitschrift für 
Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Vö1kerrecht 17 (1956-57): p. 230. 
16
 Ibid., p. 248. 
17
 Supra note 13, p. 52. 
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Functions that are mentioned above allow individual opinions to be useful and frequently 
used instrument in international adjudication: 
The pronouncement of individual judges in their separate and dissenting opinions, it is 
important to note, cover almost two and one-half times space (2, 126 pages) taken up 
by the majority opinions and judgements 9864 pages) in the official reports.
18
 
The general purpose of individual opinions seems to be more important and underestimated at 
the same time. Regular dissents may indicate that international law in particular field doesn’t 
work properly or is outdated. That could lead to the conclusion that “individual opinions may 
help to bridge the gap between the law of yesterday and tomorrow.” 19  Publication of 
individual opinions “would, incidentally, help to build up rules of international law.” 20 
However, constant discussions about the possible prohibition of publication of individual 
opinions due to the reason that such publication erodes the authority of the Court distracts the 
professional and academic community from the detailed analyses of the role of individual 
opinions it the practice of the International Court of Justice.    
2.2 Main terms, types of individual opinions of the International 
Court of Justice  
The right to dissent is frequently used by judges of the International Court of Justice. Separate 
opinions, dissenting opinions, declarations append not only to the Court’s judgments but to 
the other procedural documents of the Court, for example, orders, fixing of the time-limit
21
.  
Despite the frequency of use there is no legal definition of separate or dissenting opinions in 
the basic documents of the International Court of Justice. Article 57 of the Statute provides: 
If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the 
judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion.
22
 
By literal interpretation of Article 57 of the Statute it is possible to draw a conclusion that the 
Statute permits individual opinions only in a form of separate opinion. However, Article 95 of 
the Rules of the Court (1978) states that: 
Any judge may, if he so desires, attach his individual opinion to the judgement, 
whether he dissents from the majority or not; a judge who wishes to record his 
concurrence or dissent without stating his reasons may do so in the form of a 
declaration. The same shall also apply to orders made by the Court
23
. 
                                                 
18
 R.P. Anand, “The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication” The 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 14, no.3 (1965): p. 789. 
19
 Hambro, supra note 15, p. 248. 
20
 Supra note 13, p.66. 
21
 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Order of 6 
December 2016, I.C.J. Reports 2016, Separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, p. 1137. 
22
 International Court of Justice. Statute of the International Court of Justice. Available on: https://www.icj-
cij.org/en/statute Accessed May 20, 2019. 
23
 International Court of Justice. Rules of Court (adopted March 24, 1922) Available on: https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_D/D_01.pdf Accessed May 20, 2019. 
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Article 57 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice said without further 
detail that “dissenting judges are entitled to deliver a separate opinion.”24  
Simple analysis of these provisions shows that basic documents of the International Court of 
Justice make no distinction between separate and dissenting opinions. Nevertheless, such a 
distinction appears in the Resolution concerning the Internal Judicial Practice of the Court, 
which in Article 7 provides that:  
Judges who wish to deliver separate or dissenting opinions make the text thereof 
available to the Court after the first reading is concluded and within a time-limit fixed 
by the Court.
 25
 
Furthermore, a Yearbook of the Court which provides information about activities, 
organization, administration of the Court, in the chapter describing the judgment has a 
statement that: 
Any judge is entitled to attach a separate or dissenting opinion, or a declaration which 
records his or her position without stating his or her reasons.
26 
Also, it might be justified to say that provisions of Article 57 the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice could be interpreted in the way that word “separate” is used as a general term 
for individual opinions and includes both concurring and dissenting opinions. 
Such inconsistency between documents that regulate the work of the Court shows that the 
question of individual opinions still has not been resolved definitively. The Statute has 
established only one form of individual opinion which is the separate opinion. The Rules of 
the Court interpret the Statute very widely and add the form of individual opinion, which 
might represent the dissent, concurrence or semi concurrence in the form of a declaration. 
Apart from that, the Rules of the Court permit appending individual opinions to orders made 
by the Court. This diverges from the straightforward statement in the Statute that the system 
of individual opinions applies only to judgments of the Court. The Statute does not have the 
provisions on the possibility to append individual opinion to orders of the Court or other 
procedural documents.  
Finally, the Resolution concerning the Internal Judicial Practice of the Court introduces the 
concept of dissenting opinion.  
The reasons for the emergence of this inconsistency might be that the Court has created its 
own work practice with individual opinions. This practice is accepted and followed by judges 
of the Court for a long period of time. Judges of the International Court of Justice do not need 
a detailed explanation on how to distinguish a separate opinion from a dissenting opinion. The 
Court by its practice has developed and evolved the system of individual opinions and does 
not question the legitimacy of that system according to the letter of the Statute. The practice 
                                                 
24
 International Court of Justice. Statute and Rules of the Court, First Edition, Series D. №.1, 1926 Available on: 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_D/D_01_1e_edition.pdf Accessed 
May 20, 2019.  
 
25
 International Court of Justice. Resolution concerning the internal judicial practice of the Court, 1976 
Available on: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/other-texts/resolution-concerning-judicial-practice Accessed May 20, 
2019.  
26
International Court of Justice. Yearbook of the Court 2016-2017, p. 83 Available on: https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/publications/yearbook-2016-2017.pdf Accessed May 20, 2019. 
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established by the Court gives reason to believe that the existence of individual opinions in 
different forms without any limitation of procedural documents to which individual opinions 
can be appended is consistent with the spirit of the Statute. However, such wide interpretation 
of the provisions of the Statute might need to be legitimized in order to strengthen the 
authority of the Court. The procedural aspects of the work of the Court should not be 
underestimated. It is a natural development of the law when the established practice is 
reflected in legislation. It seems desirable for the International Court of Justice as the 
principal judicial organ in international adjudication to secure the practice adopted by the 
Court by amending the Statute or the Rules of the Court with the provisions on individual 
opinions that reflect existing practice.   
For the academic purposes a major distinction between separate and dissenting opinions is 
presented in this research. A separate opinion is an opinion where the judge who concurred 
with the majority and concurred with the conclusions of the judgement describes how he 
reached the same conclusion but upon a different basis of reasoning. The Committee of Jurists 
discussed the nature of separate opinions and distinguished separate opinions from dissenting 
opinions. The drafters of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice noted that 
a certain part of dissent could be possible even when there is a concurrence in conclusions. 
The reason behind the acknowledgement of the necessity of separate opinions was to give to a 
judge the opportunity to explain his or her findings in a separate document even when 
concurring with a majority. Otherwise divergent reasonings may appear in the judgement that 
may lead to a weakness in the judgement, because such judgements “tended to take the form 
of a compromise”27. Also, the preconditions for the acknowledgement of the necessity of 
separate opinions can be found in the work of the Court. The practice to allow judges to 
express an opinion different from a dissenting one has already started to form. The Annual 
Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice states that “In the case of Advisory 
Opinion No. 7, Lord Finlay, while concurring in the opinion of the Court, was permitted to 
add observations in regard to the reasoning adopted by the Court.”28 And that  “In the case of 
Judgment No. 7, Lord Finlay who agreed with the conclusions of the judgment, but not with 
al1 the reasons given for one of these conclusions, was permitted to explain his views by 
means of observations which were attached to the printed text of the judgment and read by 
him in Court.”29 The language of these statements indicates the permissive character of the 
opportunity that was used by Lord Finlay. In contrast, in the same section the possibility to 
attach dissenting opinion to the judgment is no longer under discussion, it is perceived as a 
right of a judge. The fact that it was “permitted” to Lord Finlay to express his concurring and 
yet different views leads to a conclusion that the Court felt the necessity to take a special 
decision about the future of separate concurring opinions.  
A dissenting opinion is a non-concurring opinion in which the judge expresses his or her own 
views against the conclusion which had been reached by the Court. The existence of a 
dissenting opinion may possibly show that arguments of a government which lost a case were 
heard and that the government “had not been quite wrong in bringing the case before the 
                                                 
27
 Supra note 13, p.65. 
28
 International Court of Justice. Annual report from 1925-1926, p.173 Available on: https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/permanent-court-of-international-justice/serie_E/English/E_02_en.pdf Accessed May 20, 2019.  
29
 Ibid., p.173-174. 
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Court”30. The absence of such opinions may create a false impression that the judgment 
reflects the views of all judges and it is doubtful that the authority of the Court could be 
increased by hiding the truth. 
2.3 The scope and legal nature of individual opinions of the 
International Court of Justice 
It might seem obvious and logical that the scope of individual opinions is limited by the 
reasons and matters that are presented in the majority opinion. However, the question remains 
whether judges are allowed to express their conclusions in dissenting or separate opinions on 
issues that are not included in the judgement but are important for the case from the point of 
view of these judges.  
As it was already said there is no legal definition of individual opinions - both dissenting and 
separate - in the Statute of the Court and in the Rules of the Court. The absence of a definition 
which could determine the limits of individual opinions in relation to the scope of a 
judgement leaves the possibility for a wide interpretation of Article 57 of the Statute. The 
practice of the International Court of Justice shows that dissenting judges use conception 
similar to conception “competence competence” to determine the limit of freedom of 
expression, in a sense that they are presumed to be competent to decide the limits of the scope 
of their own individual opinions.    Accordingly, without a general guideline from the Court 
on such an important topic, each judge shall decide for himself whether he or she crosses the 
line of relevance and admissibility of the views indicated in the individual opinion in 
question.   
Thus, two divergent theories were developed inside the Court. The liberal theory states that 
rights granted to judges by Article 57 of the Statute of the Court are not subject to any 
limitation; therefore, dissenting judges have full freedom of expression and are not limited by 
matters decided in the judgement. Another theory has a restrictive character and its purpose is 
to restrain the scope of individual opinions and keep the views expressed in these opinions 
within the framework of the judgement of the Court. These two theories surfaced within the 
Court in connection with the judgement and individual opinions to the judgment in the South 
West Africa case
31
.  
The restrictive theory was introduced by the President of the Court Sir Percy Spender. Sir 
Percy appended a declaration in which he asked himself a question whether “it is permissible 
or appropriate to express by way of separate opinion my views on these additional grounds 
for rejecting the Applicants' claims or certain of them.”32 In the declaration Sir Percy makes 
an attempt to interpret the provisions of Article 57 of the Statute in the light of deliberations 
in the work of the Advisory Committee of Jurists and the Committee of Jurists which had 
been undertaken before the right to dissent was given to judges of the Court. He emphasises 
that historically the right to append an individual opinion in the form of a separate or 
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dissenting opinion for judges of the Court gave rise to much debates and was granted as the 
result of a compromise. He also implies that drafters of the Statute of the Court did not intend 
to give judges the possibility to express their views on matters outside the scope of the 
judgement. Individual opinions are connected with the judgement, these opinions by their 
nature do not have an independent character, they are limited by the motivation in the 
judgement. Accordingly, Sir Percy formulates four major features of individual opinions. 
Individual opinions must have a direct connection with a judgement, individual opinions are 
secondary to the judgement which “must be the focal point of the different judicial views 
expressed on any occasion.”33, individual opinions should not deal with questions which are 
outside the scope of the Court’s judgement, and there should be an inevitable link between 
individual opinions and the judgement. The main argument of the restrictive theory is that the 
Court’s general function is to render a judgement or an advisory opinion. A judgment, 
obviously, is paramount compared to individual opinions. Needless to say, that without a 
judgement the purpose of existence of individual opinions is reduced to zero. Individual 
opinions as a part of the system of the work of the Court exist only when the Court renders a 
judgement.
34
 Article 57 of the Statute of the Court grants the right to deliver a separate 
opinion “If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the 
judges.”35 Thus, the right to deliver individual opinion is inseparable from the very existence 
of a judgement of the Court. This right is not an independent right. It is impossible to imagine 
the situation where an individual opinion could be delivered in the absence of a judgement. 
Apart from that, individual opinion should not replace the judgement. The judgement is 
rendered in the name of the Court but not under the name of individual judge. The purpose of 
individual opinions is not to decide the case but to lighten up gaps in international law and 
speed its development. In the dissenting opinion in the Continental Shelf case Judge Mosler 
underlined this idea: 
Since it cannot be the legitimate purpose of a separate opinion of a judge being in the 
minority to offer an alternative decision, but rather to explain why he is not able to 
follow the reasoning and result of the Judgment, my remarks will concentrate only on 
the principal points of divergence of views. 
36
 
These statements bring up the conclusion that the freedom of expression of the judge in 
individual opinions might be restricted by the scope of the judgement. This issue becomes 
highly sensitive in the cases where the majority is small or where there is no majority at all. 
The best example is the South West Africa case
37
 where votes were equally divided, and the 
President of the Court had to cast the decisive vote. It was noted before that even publication 
of the information on the results of voting creates concerns about how such publication might 
affect the authority of the Court. The reasoning in individual opinions which goes beyond the 
scope of the judgement could possibly make an impression of internal division in the Court. 
The authority of the Court could be shaken because individual opinions which focus on 
matters outside the framework of the judgement may represent not so much commentary on 
the judgment itself but criticism of the work of the Court in reaching a particular decision. 
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The criticism on the work of the Court shaped in the form of a judicial opinion could 
objectively be damaging to the authority and the reputation of the Court. 
The liberal theory was represented by Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion to the judgment  
in the South West Africa case.
38
 He stated that “The opinion of the majority is nothing but the 
common denominator among the opinions of judges who constitute the majority, but do not 
necessarily agree on the reasoning.”39 According to conclusions of Judge Tanaka, individual 
opinions are fully separated and independent from the majority decision. In his view this 
approach is especially important when it is applied to dissenting opinions that by their nature 
can significantly differ in reasoning from the judgement. In fact: 
Disagreement between the dissenting view and the majority view is not limited to the 
matter of legal right or interest but it is concerned with the whole attitude vis-à-vis al1 
questions on the merits. The dissenting judges are able to argue on the hypothesis that 
their contention regarding the existence of the Applicants' legal right or interest is well 
founded. 
40
 
Judge Tanaka applied this theory also in his separate opinion to the judgement in the 
Barcelona Traction case.
41
 Judge Tanaka pointed out that his separate opinion is not limited 
by the framework of the majority opinion, he emphasized “I feel that I must follow a logical 
process of my own which, according to my conscience, I believe to be just.”42 Judge Jessup in 
his separate opinion to the judgement in the Barcelona Traction case
43
 also interpreted Article 
57 of the Statute of the Court according to the liberal theory of the scope of individual 
opinions. He stated, “I regret that the Court has not considered it appropriate to include in its 
Judgment a wider range of legal considerations.”44 Judge Canćado Trindade in Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State case went further in his dissenting opinion by stating: 
My dissenting position is grounded not only on the assessment of the arguments 
produced before the Court by the contending Parties (Germany and Italy) and the 
intervening State (Greece), but above all on issues of principle and on fundamental 
values, to which I attach even greater importance.
45
  
The absence of the limits of the scope of individual opinions does not automatically mean that 
these opinions do not have any scope at all. According to the statements of the proponents of 
the liberal theory the case itself forms the framework of the individual opinions. There is 
undeniable positive effect of the liberal theory. The existence of individual opinions which 
have the substance that is not limited by the framework of the majority decision could 
guarantee the higher quality of the judgement of the Court. The drafts of individual opinions 
are available to the majority and their preliminary content is not a secret to the Court in 
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accordance with Article 7 of the Resolution concerning the Internal Judicial Practice of the 
Court.
46
 Consequently, it could persuade the Court to check every aspect of the case more 
carefully and might influence the process of deliberations. 
The practice of the International Court of Justice after the South West Africa case shows that 
there are no longer significant debates in the Court anymore about these two theories. 
However, it is be possible to trace the position of a particular judge regarding the scope of the 
individual opinion in his or her individual opinions. Some judges write their individual 
opinions in a restrictive way with respect to the majority decision. Others do not limit their 
dissent with the framework of the judgement of the Court. Thus, until the definition of 
individual opinion is included in the basic documents of the Court tension within the Court 
may emerge for the reason to limit the scope of individual opinions. Such a situation could 
threaten the authority of the Court more than could the judges who simply exercise their 
freedom of expression.  
Another important aspect which needs to be determined is whether it is a right or an 
obligation to append individual opinion to the judgement. Although, this problem had been 
already solved in the basic documents of the International Court of Justice, it worth to pay 
attention that Committee of Jurists discussed the nature of individual opinions in great details 
in 1926. There was an opinion amongst the members of Committee of Jurists that it is a duty 
to append the statement of dissent. This opinion was formed under the influence of practice 
when a judge who voted against the majority decision did not want to make reasons for his 
voting public. Also, there were occasions when a dissenting judge, on the one hand, did not 
want to make his dissent public by appending reasoned dissent to a judgement but, on the 
other hand, attached it to the minutes of private deliberations of the Court. The practice to 
append the statement of dissent to the minutes of the Court was abolished. The idea behind 
consideration whether it is a right or an obligation to append individual opinion was that 
dissent must always be reasoned. The question was raised whether the fact of dissent should 
be recorded when the dissent is not reasoned. The main argument against the proposal that the 
dissent should be recorded only when it is reasoned was that this new order could create a 
false impression on how the judgement was rendered. For example, if only one judge decides 
to record reasons for his dissent in a form of dissenting opinion, the public might think that 
only one judge voted against the majority decision. It was also discussed whether “a vote 
against the opinion of the majority was in itself a dissenting vote.” 47 The distinction was 
made, and the conception of dissenting vote was defined, as meaning a reasoned negative 
vote. At the same time, it was decided that in order to keep the secrecy of deliberations of the 
Court the names of judges who dissented should not be published unless the dissenting judge 
requests such publication. The judgment should state the results of voting only in numbers. 
By means of interpretation of Article 57 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice it was decided that provisions of the Statute do not impose an obligation on judges to 
append the statement of dissent. 
48
 The fact of the dissent should be recorded under the 
request of a judge even when the judge does not provide any public reasons for his opinion. 
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“The judges had been given the right to dissent, but no duty had been imposed upon them.”49 
Article 95 of the Rules of the International Court of Justice (1978) gives straight answer to the 
question above. It provides that “Any judge may, if he so desires, attach his individual 
opinion to the judgement, whether he dissents from the majority or not.”50 Furthermore, the 
same article states that “a judge who wishes to record his concurrence or dissent without 
stating his reasons may do so in the form of a declaration.”51The practice of the International 
Court of Justice is in harmony with the decisions made by Committee of Jurists. The Court 
makes a distinction between “negative” vote and “dissenting” vote. The absence of dissenting 
opinions to the judgement does not automatically mean that the voting was unanimous.
52
 It is 
no longer under the question that Article 57 of the Statute conferred the right to the judges but 
did not set the obligation. The examples confirming this conclusion can be found in the 
practice of the International Court of Justice.
53
 
The acknowledgement that the negative vote and the dissenting vote are not always 
concurring made by the members of Committee of Jurists and the subsequent practice of the 
International Court of Justice could serve as one of the characteristics that distinguish 
dissenting opinion from separate opinion. A dissenting opinion is always a negative but 
negative vote is not always dissenting. Nevertheless, this obvious statement is controversial to 
the provisions of Article 57 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. In this Article 
the Statute states that when the judgement does not represent the opinion of the judge in 
whole, the judge has a right to “deliver a separate opinion.”54 Consequently, it would not be a 
mistake and would be in accordance with the Statute of the Court for a judge to present 
reasons for his or her negative vote in a separate opinion. Article 95 of the Rules of the Court 
does not elucidate this hypothetical situation because it states that “Any judge may, if he so 
desires, attach his individual opinion to the judgment, whether he dissents from the majority 
or not.”55 One could say that the term “separate opinion” in Article 57 of the Statute is used as 
a general term to all individual opinions, however, provisions of the Internal Judicial Practice 
of the Court in Article 7 state the opposite and distinguish separate opinion from dissenting
56
.  
On the one hand, this hypothetical situation seems to be not probable, due to the high 
qualification of judges, but on the other hand, inconsistency between the definitions of the 
types of individual opinions in the basic documents of the Court could possibly mislead the 
Court and the public.  
In conclusion, it should be noted that the system of individual opinions in the Court of 
International Justice is still developing, although it seems that the Court tries to dismiss this 
fact. The decision to implement this system in work of the principal judicial body in 
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international adjudication was made as a result of compromise. There was no strong 
conviction amongst the drafters of the basic document of the Court whether the decision to 
accept the system of individual opinions was the right one. The right to append an individual 
opinion to the judgment was granted in a truncated form without a clear definition of its 
scope. Yet, individual opinions have become an inalienable part of the work of the Court. 
However, the impression lingers that while being fully accepted by individual judges who 
wish to exercise their right, the individual opinion as a concept is not embraced by the Court 
as a body. The fact that the Statute of the Court makes no distinction between separate and 
dissenting opinion only proves this assumption. The system of individual opinions functions 
upon the established practice of the Court and not upon specific provisions. This does not 
strengthen the standing of individual opinions in the work of the Court, but then neither does 
it strengthens the authority of the Court itself.   
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3 DISPUTABLE ASPECTS OF THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE  
3.1 Publication of opinions  
The system of publication of individual opinions which has been adopted in the work of the 
International Court of Justice is used as an argument in support of individual opinions as well 
as an argument against them.  
Since the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the predecessor of the 
International Court of Justice, the question of whether individual opinions should be made 
available to the general public has been almost as significantly debated as the question of 
individual opinions itself. Although the provisions on the publication of individual opinions 
were included in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Committee of 
Jurists discussed the possibility of prohibiting publication in view of proposals of some 
members of the Committee in 1926 and in 1929, respectively. Both discussions lead to the 
conclusion which the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice has described as 
part of a policy of openness: any steps towards secrecy would not be in consistent with the 
provisions of the Statute. The International Court of Justice has followed this practice. The 
provisions of the Statute of the International Court of Justice that regulate disclosure of 
individual opinions have not been changed substantively in comparison with the similar 
provisions of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The policy of 
transparency which has been adopted by the Permanent Court of International Justice has 
been strengthened by the practice of the International Court of Justice. However, the criticism 
of the system of publication of individual opinions has never really ceased.  
The key arguments against the publication of the individual opinions emerged from the 
continental doctrine of law that has the principle of a strict secrecy of deliberations and voting 
and, consequently, does not permit individual opinions at all. According to the continental 
doctrine of law a decision of a court should be anonymous and unanimous, it should represent 
the fulfillment of the judicial function by the court as a collective body. The opponents of the 
principle of publicity in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice usually claim that there are four main reasons that 
justify the prohibition of the publication of individual opinions. The first reason is that the 
publication of individual opinions possibly affects the rule of secrecy of deliberations of the 
Court. The second reason is that it is a threat to the independence of a judge. A third reason is 
that publication of individual opinions, and especially dissenting opinions, decreases the 
authority of the Court. The fourth and final reason is that disclosure of information that the 
Court’s decision was not unanimous decreases the authority of the judgement in question.  
The supporters of publication of individual opinions argue that the principle of publicity does 
not reduce the authority of the Court but, on the contrary, increases it. Also, arguments in 
support of publication of individual opinions are that such publication serves as a guarantee 
for the quality of the Court’s judgement. It is one of the guarantees of the independence of a 
judge and it is one of the components of the principle of the personal responsibility of judges. 
All arguments mentioned above were discussed in the work of Committee of Jurists in 1926. 
Nevertheless, the issue of the secrecy of deliberations was debated more than any other issue. 
The members of the Committee had different points of view regarding the hierarchy of  
principles in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. There was no 
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unanimous opinion in the Committee about the question which principle should prevail: the 
principle of the secrecy of deliberations or the principle of publicity. On the one hand, 
deliberations of the Court must be private and should remain secret. President Loder, a clear 
proponent of this principle, made a remark that provisions of the Statute on the secrecy of 
deliberations establish a general rule and that provisions of the Statute allowing to append 
dissenting opinions to the judgement of the Court are and should remain an exception to that 
rule. There was however also a point of view that “the fundamental principle of the Statute 
was that of publicity”57 and that the rule of secrecy was just an exception to that principle. In 
order to reach a solution, the Committee has distinguished the actual secrecy of deliberations 
from the publicity of the voting results. It was eventually decided that disclosure of voting 
results with or without publication of individual opinions could not affect the secrecy of 
deliberations. This conclusion was made with the consideration that the Statute obliges the 
judgement of the Court to be published, and the Court therefor must state the reasons on 
which the judgment of the Court is based. It was also decided that voting results will be 
published only in numbers without the indication of names of the judges
58
 concerned. This 
approach of the Committee once again has represented a compromise between the 
representatives of the civil law school and the representatives of the common law tradition. 
Also, the Committee had a purpose to ensure the secrecy of deliberations in order to prevent 
any possible manipulations by the states in relation to the “national” judges. The rule was 
followed by the International Court of Justice until 1978 when the Rules of the Court were 
amended. Article 95 of the Rules of the Court provided that the judgement shall contain “the 
number and names of the judges constituting the majority.”59 However, texts of the Court’s 
judgements also contain the names of judges in the minority.
60
 This amendment to the Rules 
of the Court has reopened the discussion about the risks of the publication of individual 
opinions. The supporters of the system of publication of individual opinions point out that the 
decision of the Court to publish the names of judges who constitute the majority proves that 
anonymity is not an unconditional prerequisite for impartiality and that such a decision is just 
a natural development in the direction of openness that has been defined since the work of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice.
61
 On the other hand, these changes in the provisions 
of the Rules of the Court have been criticized for the reasons that publication of judges’ votes 
“makes a mockery out of the secrecy of the deliberations”62 and that votes that have not been 
disclosed are “protected by the anonymity of a “unanimous” court.”63 Furthermore, the former 
President of the International Court of Justice, Gilbert Guillaume stated that: 
The independence of a court is a function not only of the procedures for judicial 
appointments and of the status of judges, but also of the manner in which the court in 
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question is organized and functions. In this respect, it should be pointed out that the 
secrecy of deliberations is a crucial guarantee of a judge’s independence.64 
Despite the argument that the system of publication of individual opinions negatively affects 
the secrecy of deliberations, it is undeniable that still the actual process of the Court’s 
deliberations has remained secret.
65
 The secrecy of deliberations, provided by the Statute of 
the Court is protected by the judges of the Court. The secrecy remains not only in connection 
with external relations but even within the internal procedure of the Court itself. “After the 
preliminary deliberation, each judge prepares a written note which is distributed, initially 
anonymously, to his colleagues.” 66  The majority decision is drafted by the drafting 
committee. The election of the members of drafting committee is “a truly “secret” process - 
judges indicated that they did not discuss their votes with colleagues”67. Moreover, the reason 
for the reform of the Rules of the Court permitting the publication of the names of the judges 
in the majority, was, inter alia, that the prohibition of the disclosure of the votes of judges 
“stimulated some of their colleagues to make their thoughts on a case public via the separate 
opinion route.”68  
During the work of the International Court of Justice only once the secrecy of actual 
deliberations has been seriously violated. Before the Court’s Order of 22 June 1973 indicating 
provisional measures in the Nuclear Tests case had been read in public, the press published 
the probable decision of the Court with the indication of precise voting results upon this 
decision, the Prime Minister of Australia stated that the Court reached the decision in favor of 
Australia by eight votes to six.
69
 The Court had started an internal investigation immediately. 
The investigation had not revealed the source of the publication and had been terminated. The 
fact of termination of the investigation has been criticized by the separate opinion of Judge 
Gros.
70
  The President of the Court appended the declaration to the judgement, which stated 
that: 
Good administration of justice and respect for the Court require that the outcome of its 
deliberations be kept in strict secrecy and nothing of its decision be published until it 
is officially rendered.
71
  
This incident showed that the Court also distinguishes the secrecy of actual deliberations and 
the publicity of voting results. When the publication of voting results has been made after the 
actual deliberations have been finished and the decision has been rendered it does not 
influence on the secrecy of deliberations anymore.  
Based on the facts and not only on theoretical assumptions, no causal relationship was 
indicated between the permission of publication of individual opinions and possible 
disclosure of the actual process of the Court’s deliberations. Amongst scholars there is a 
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universal opinion that the actual process of deliberations is “something of a mystery”72 and it 
seems that judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the International 
Court of Justice have successfully maintained this “mystery” before and after the reform of 
the Rules of the Court mentioned above.  
Some judges of the Court even express the opinion that still the level of transparency of 
deliberations should be increased even further. The Court’s Order of 07 December 2016 has 
indicated provisional measures in the Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Equatorial 
Guinea v. France) case. The voting was unanimous. However, Judge Gaja in his declaration 
claimed that decisions of the Court on the minor requests of the parties had not been recorded 
in the operative part of the Order. Also, Judge Gaja stated that there was no reference made in 
the Order to individual opinions of judges, which had expressed regarding such requests of 
the parties.
73
 This shows that some results of deliberations are not available to the general 
public. Moreover, it might show that not all individual opinions have been made public. 
Furthermore, it again raises the question about the scope of individual opinions. Obviously, 
that limiting the scope of individual opinions with that of the judgement would lead to the 
situations where only the majority would decide which requests of the parties are minor. As 
these requests were not discussed in the decision it would be impossible for the individual 
judges to comment on such requests in their individual opinions. This could lead to the 
possibility of the majority of the Court controlling the freedom of expression of the minority 
of the Court. On the other hand, Judge Gaja stated that “It may be excessive to suggest that all 
the decisions concerning even minor requests of provisional measures should be recorded in 
the dispositif”74 but further he claimed that it would be justified for the Court to indicate 
decisions even on minor requests and to state the names of the judges in the majority and in 
the minority on that issue. 
Also, it is important to note that even opponents of publication of individual opinions due to 
the principle of secrecy of deliberations cannot deny the positive function of the Court’s 
transparency in this matter: 
This regime does in any case have an advantage. It makes it possible for researchers to 
study voting patterns of the judges in an attempt to determine to what degree they rule 
independently of the point of view of the governments of their own countries.
75
  
This statement correlates with the second controversial aspect of publication of individual 
opinions. The problem addressed here is that publication of individual opinions could 
possibly affect the principle of independence and impartiality of a judge. The supporters of 
the publication of individual opinions claim that it could serve as an extra guarantee for the 
independence of a judge because it reduces the possibility of political interference. The right 
of judges to express their views on the matters of the case by publication of individual 
opinions and the system of publication of names of the judges constituting the majority 
obviously makes it more difficult to have an influence on a judge from outside.  
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However, the main criticism of the publication of individual opinions derives from the 
“national” voting and the voting of ad hoc judges. It is important to note that this criticism is 
usually addressed not only to the publication of individual opinions but also to the principle of 
the publicity and transparency of the Court in general. There is a point of view that the 
judgment of the Court must be anonymous, otherwise “judges would be tempted to "please" 
the countries (or legal systems) from which they came”76 and that “the publicity tends to 
accentuate rather than muffle nationality” 77 , consequently, “the myth of the Court's 
impartiality is seriously and unnecessarily hampered because the stands of individual judges 
become known.”78 Indeed, this concern has been seriously discussed by the scholars since the 
work of the Committee of Jurists on the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1929.
79
 However, studies made in the different periods of time the aim of which 
was to analyze the voting behavior of national judges and judges ad hoc came to the 
conclusion that no significant correlation can be established between the publication of 
individual opinions and voting results. The reason why such correlation had never been 
statistically proven is that the correlation between the nationality of a judge and the results of 
his voting had never been established at the first place. In other words, national judges do not 
vote in favor of their own government as frequently as it might seem.
80
 Also, it was concluded 
that sometimes the nationality of judges does, to some extent, determine their voting but the 
reason for this is the “attachment to the cultural values particular to their home country”81 and 
not the political considerations. The situation with the voting of ad hoc judges is different and 
the studies show that they usually vote in favor of the State which appointed them.
82
 
Nevertheless, the mere possibility of existence of such studies is  due to the principle of the 
publicity and transparency of the Court. If the publication of individual opinions was 
prohibited and unanimity of the judgement of the Court presumed, there would be no reliable 
data on voting behavior of “national” judges and ad hoc judges. The accurate and relevant 
data on voting behavior give a wide range for future analyses of the work of the Court which 
could lead to positive changes in particular systems of the Court, for example, in the 
frequently criticized system of judges ad hoc. Also, such studies prove that judges in 
international adjudication are truly independent and impartial and are not influenced by their 
national government. Even the opponents of the publication of individual opinions 
acknowledge that according to the conclusions of the studies “independence is above all a 
question of character. The only judges put under pressure are those thought likely to cede to 
it. A judge who wants to be independent is.”83 These conclusions undoubtedly increase the 
authority of the Court and might end the discussion on whether the publication of individual 
opinions reduces the prestige of the Court. 
Furthermore, it could be presumed that the system of publication of individual opinions has 
influenced on voting behavior of “national” judges and ad hoc judges in a positive way. 
Although there is no obligation for judges to append a reasoned dissenting opinion and 
dissent can be expressed in the form of declaration, disclosure of voting results make it 
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impossible for a “national” judge and a judge ad hoc to vote consistently and without proper 
reasoning in favor of their own government or the government which has appointed them. It 
would be obvious for observers of the work of the Court that there might be a political 
motivation behind the vote of a particular judge if the judge constantly votes in favor of his 
government and does not give any explanation of the voting by means of separate or 
dissenting opinions. Consequently, the conclusion could be made that judges understand that 
the existing system of transparency makes a systematic politically motivating voting without 
further concerns in independence and impartiality of a particular judge almost impossible. 
Thus, the system of publication of individual opinions has the function of an additional 
guarantee against votes based on political considerations. 
The third argument against publication of individual opinions is that such publication 
influences the authority of the Court. This argument is used more frequently than other 
arguments and has to be examined separately in the next subchapter. 
The fourth argument emerges out of the previous one and states that the publication of 
individual opinions decreases the authority of the Court’s judgement in a case. Article 59 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that the judgement of the Court has a 
binding effect only upon the parties and in respect to the given case.
84
 Article 60 of the Statute 
states that the decision of the Court is final and cannot be the subject of appeal
85
. The normal 
procedure of execution of decisions of the International Court of Justice is based on the 
contentious jurisdiction of the Court. Undeniably, one of the conditions for the voluntarily 
compliance of the parties in the case with the Court’s decision is the high level of the 
authority of a judgement.  
As was previously mentioned the scope of an individual opinion is not legally defined or 
limited by the matters that have been discussed in the Court’s judgement. Therefore, matters 
and reasons presented in an individual opinion might make an impression that the Court in its 
decision avoided certain aspects of the case. Also, dissenting opinions may point out some 
probable flaws in the majority decision. Moreover, the information that the judgement of the 
Court is actually a majority decision with a strong opposition represented by individual 
opinions may have a negative psychological effect on the general public. It is worth noting 
that “Also the tone of dissent the dissent has tended to be bitter and full of criticism instead of 
objective and judicial.”86 The individual judges do not limit themselves with the style of the 
Court’s judgement and frequently use literary writing style in their individual opinions87. 
Consequently, some individual opinions are very expressive and easier to read than the 
Court’s decision which is limited by its own formal nature. This may lead to a situation where 
the arguments in individual opinions might sound more persuasive than the arguments in the 
majority decision just because the form of expression in individual opinions is not restricted.  
All reasons mentioned above could, possibly, decrease the authority of the particular 
judgement of the Court. Nevertheless, individual opinions contribute to the quality of a 
judgement. The existence of individual opinions forces the drafting committee to check the 
majority decision with more scrutiny. Drafts of individual opinions are accessible to all 
members of the Court. That gives members of the Court an opportunity to examine the 
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arguments in individual opinions and possibly adjust the decision of the majority in light 
thereof. 
Another reason should be mentioned in support of publication of individual opinions. One of 
the purposes of the existence of the Court is to build an international jurisprudence. When the 
decision is rendered unanimously it could mean that the provisions of international law which 
were indicated in the decision function properly and there is no gap between the law and the 
reality. In the contrary, when the Court is fundamentally divided, and the judgement of the 
Court is a decision of the minimal majority or even the result of the casting vote of the 
President it might indicate that a change of jurisprudence have to be made.
88
 The fiction of 
unanimity could slow down or even stop the development of international law. Moreover, 
secrecy of individual opinions could be an obstacle for the Court to make use of the 
arguments from individual opinions in the case with similar circumstances.    
In academic literature one can find an indication of a problem that publication of individual 
opinions jeopardizes the secrecy of deliberations. As a solution for this particular problem the 
author proposes a reform for the International Court of Justice. The proposal includes certain 
changes in the system of disclosure of voting results and the system of the publication of 
individual opinions. The author proposes to abolish the system of disclosure of voting results 
and to adopt the system of anonymous individual opinions.
89
 In his opinion: 
Dissenting opinions would be permitted, but authors would remain unidentified. This 
reform represents an excellent compromise because both the dissent and the secrecy 
are preserved.
90
 
This proposal seems to be justified for several reasons. The first reason is that the system of 
anonymity of individual opinions could stop the debates about how publication of individual 
opinions influences the Court’s authority. The argument that the decision of the Court should 
be rendered only in the name of the Court might be not relevant anymore. Anonymous 
opinions would be not as “individual” as they are now. The anonymity might deprive judges 
of opportunity to indicate such personal characteristics in the individual opinions as their 
background, personal attitude towards certain events
91
 or even their own conscience. This 
might make the articulation of these individual opinions less expressive. Also, this might 
significantly reduce the quantity of individual opinions. It has been pointed out that “judges, 
both national and non-national, have appeared increasingly to seek the limelight of 
international attention.” 92  The system of anonymous individual opinions might lead to 
abolishment of that inclination. 
However, the analysis of this proposal also reveals its negative sides. Anonymity of 
individual opinions might turn the system of individual opinions into a system which simply 
doubles the functions of the Court. Anonymous individual opinions could create the 
impression of the multiple judgements on the particular case. Moreover, it is not clear how the 
proposed system would work. Does the proposal entail that individual opinions should be 
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anonymous for the members of the Court as well? This might create an atmosphere of secrecy 
and mistrust inside the Court. Apart from that, it is not clear how anonymous individual 
opinions should be discussed during the deliberations of the Court. The implementation of the 
proposal may require additional human resources to maintain the regime of anonymity of 
individual opinions in the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, anonymity of 
individual opinions may destroy the principle of personal responsibility in the system of 
individual opinions.  Consequently, the regime of anonymity of individual opinions may 
reduce the quality of these opinions which may decrease the quality of the judgements of the 
Court. Also, it seems justified to assume that even with a system of anonymous individual 
opinions it might be hard to hide from the public the names of the judges who append their 
individual opinions to the judgement of the Court. It should be considered that there could be 
a situation when a judge has no right to express his own opinion publicly but feels that his 
opinion gravely differs from the majority decision. This situation may lead to a natural desire 
of a judge to explain himself privately, which cannot be considered a good practice. 
In conclusion, it is important to state that the system of publication of individual opinions has 
already been in existence for a century. During this time the system has been developing in 
the direction of more openness and transparency. Despite persistent criticism, the system of 
publication of individual opinions works. The practice of the Court shows that transparency 
does not lead to systematic negative effects. No objective correlation was established between 
the publication of dissenting opinions and probable refusal of a state to give consent on which 
the jurisdiction of the Court is based. That means that the system of publication of individual 
opinions has not decreased the influence of the Court in international adjudication. The 
secrecy of deliberations remains one of the fundamental principles of the work of the Court 
and has not been affected by the publication on individual opinions. The independence of 
judges could, inter alia, be ensured by their status, requirements for election, duration of the 
term of office, experience, character of a judge as well as by transparency of the processes 
and the procedures inside the Court.  Restrictions on the policy of openness and transparency 
of the Court does not ensure the independence of a judge, on contrary such restrictions could 
create an atmosphere of unnecessary secrecy which can potentially hide or manipulate the 
truth. The main objective of the Court is to establish the truth. The first step to fulfill that 
purpose is to open the truth about the Court to the general public. Individual opinions do exist 
in the practice of the International Court of justice and any steps towards prohibition for their 
publication would serve as a foundation for untruth.  
3.2 Diminishment of the prestige of the Court  
Amongst the arguments for the abolishment of the system of individual opinions the argument 
that this system decreases the authority and the prestige of the Court is used more frequently 
than others. This argument has been examined by the scholars who researched the role of 
individual opinions in international adjudication as well as by judges of the Court. The 
problem of possible diminishment of the authority of the Court by individual opinions has 
been also addressed in the work of Committee of Jurists on the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice in 1929. 
The criticism of the principle of openness of the Court usually comes from the representatives 
of the continental system of law. According to the continental school of law, it is presumed 
that the judgment must be rendered by the Court as a body and should be anonymous. In other 
words, the decision should be made in the name of the Court and not in the names of 
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individual judges or a group of individual judges. Consequently, the disclosure of information 
on the internal processes of the Court and the acknowledgement of the fact that the judgement 
has a dissent makes the decision not final from above mentioned point of view. The 
publication of individual opinions, especially dissenting ones, gives reasons to open a 
discussion about the case outside the Court. These discussions also could lead to the situation 
where the decision is understood by the general public as not being final.
93
 The absence of 
finality of the decision of the Court is considered to decrease the authority of the Court.  
Some scholars express fierce critique of the system of individual opinions. In their point of 
view this system reduces the authority of the Court, especially when the judgement of the 
Court is accompanied by the great number of individual opinions:  
But the International Court of Justice - depending for its authority in the widest sense 
more on the persuasiveness of its pronouncements than on the binding nature of its 
judgements - cannot afford to have 'in-house', 'official' critics. The appending of 
individual opinions simply is not healthy.
94
  
Indeed, there are cases in the practice of the Court in which each of the judges of the Court 
has delivered separate or dissenting opinion or has expressed him- or herself in a form of 
declaration. For example, the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case95. The 
Court has exercised its advisory jurisdiction in that case and rendered an advisory opinion 
with each judge appending his individual opinion to the advisory opinion of the Court. The 
crucial question of that advisory opinion was whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence of the state. The 
Court could not reach a conclusion because it was equally divided, and the majority decision 
made by the President’s casting vote. Such situation may lead to the question, whether the 
Court has the ability to render an authoritative decision in complex cases. Also, this might 
reopen the discussion about the permission to append individual opinions to advisory 
opinions of the Court. The aim of the advisory procedure is, inter alia, to clarify aspects of 
international law. It is hard to believe that international law can be clarified when in addition 
to the advisory opinion of the Court, the applicant in the procedure gets individual opinions 
from all the members of the Court. As the advisory opinion has no binding force, what would 
preclude the applicant from using one of the individual opinions instead of the advisory 
opinion of the Court? How the authority of the advisory opinion could be established if the 
decision of the Court has been made by the President’s casting vote and individual opinions 
from each member of the Court are available for the parties? It seems that in such cases it is 
not enough to merely render the decision in the name of the Court to establish the authority of 
the advisory opinion. The assumption might be made that it would be more positive for the 
authority of a particular advisory opinion of the Court if that opinion had been rendered 
anonymously and unanimously. Nevertheless, this situation shows that provisions of 
international law on the issue have not been settled completely. Judge Oda in his dissenting 
opinion on the case stated that: 
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Conclusions reached by the Court in the present Opinion do not constitute a real 
response to the request, and I am afraid that this unimpressive result may cause some 
damage to the Court's credibility.
96
  
However, in the view of Judge Oda, the real reason why the Court’s decision could have lost 
its authority was not in the quantity of individual opinions. Judge Oda claimed that the Court 
should have dismissed the request in the case on account of the general nature of the question 
in the request. He stated that the case was more of “an academic or intellectual nature"97 and 
that there had been no practical necessity in solving that case.
98
 Thus, it leads to a conclusion 
that the quantity of individual opinions in the particular case might be the mere consequence 
of some other problems that exist in the work of the Court. Also, it can be a signal for the 
acknowledgment that the problems exist. The elimination of the consequence does not, 
automatically, eliminates the reason of the problem. Individual opinions perform a function of 
indication of problems that may exist in the work of the Court.  
The situation mentioned above is an exception. However, multiple dissenting opinions which 
have different approaches to the same case could create an impression that the particular case 
is so complex by its nature that it could not be definitively resolved. The dissenting or even 
separate opinions might give the interpretation of the provisions of international law that 
differs from the interpretation of the same provisions in the majority decision. This, without a 
doubt, could confuse the general public, or could even be deliberately used by the losing party 
to decrease the authority of the Court’s decision.  
On the other hand, supporters of the system of individual opinions state that the concept of 
unanimity is a fiction.
99
 It would be contrary to the aim of the system of justice to keep the 
truth from the public and support this fiction. “The value of a decision of the Court varied 
according as it was taken by a unanimous or majority vote.”100 It is obvious, that the decision 
that has been rendered unanimously is valued more than the decision that has been rendered 
by the minimal majority. But this estimate of “the value” of a decision of the Court is 
applicable only to a particular case. The authority of the Court rests not only on “the value” of 
its particular decisions. The prestige of the Court might be evaluated, inter alia, by the ability 
of the Court to accept that there is no permanent unanimity in its work and also by the 
willingness to disclose this information to the public. 
Furthermore, it would be wrong to regulate the work of any international court in accordance 
with the practice that was originally developed on the national level. Thus, the principles of 
the continental school of law could not be used as exclusive principles in the practice of the 
international courts.  
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4 IN DEFENCE OF INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE   
4.1 The individual opinion as a source for interpretation or 
elucidation of a judgement of the International Court of Justice 
It seems justified to state that the criticism of the system of individual opinions is mostly 
based on theoretical assumptions. However, in the practice of the International Court of 
Justice individual opinions “have their uses.”101 The significant role of individual opinions is 
to be a source for interpretation or elucidation of a judgement of the Court. This function of 
individual opinions has been indicated as important by the scholars
102
 and is usually not 
contested by the opponents of the system of individual opinions. Also, judges of the Court 
have pointed out that:  
Separate opinions provide a means for making known the reasons for the votes of 
members of the majority and this may be useful for the purposes of critical studies by 
commentators.
103
  
However, it is especially valuable when the Court itself in its judgements expresses its 
opinion in respect to a particular issue. Although indirectly, but the Court had supported the 
hypothesis that one of the functions of individual opinions is to interpret or elucidate its 
judgements.  
The Court had expressed its point of view on this issue in the Application for Review of 
Judgment No. 333 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal case. It that case the Court 
was asked to give an advisory opinion on the merits of the decision of the United Nations 
Administrative Tribunal (the Administrative Tribunal). It is interesting that in its advisory 
opinion the Court has pointed out that the Administrative Tribunal adopted the practice of the 
Court in regard to the functioning of the system of individual opinions. It was noted by the 
Court that the Administrative Tribunal had permitted not only to append individual opinions 
to the judgement, but also to publish them, which was considered by the Court a “the wise 
practice.”104 The Court stated that in order to understand the decision of the Administrative 
Tribunal it is important to examine individual opinions on that judgement.
105
 The Court also 
stated that: 
In order to interpret or elucidate a judgement it is both permissible and advisable to 
take into account any dissenting or other opinions appended to the judgement. 
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Declarations or opinions drafted by members of a tribunal at the time of a decision, 
and appended thereto, may contribute to the clarification of the decision.
106
 
This statement of the Court was given in respect with to a particular case. However, it seems 
justified to assume the statement was of a general character. By literal interpretation of that 
statement it might be presumed that the Court addressed its opinion to all judicial organs in 
international adjudication. This could lead to a conclusion that the statement may be applied 
to the Court itself. Thus, the Court does not consider individual opinions as an internal 
critique of its work. Moreover, one can assume that the Court does not separate individual 
opinions from the judgement. “Individual opinions are best read as indissociable from the 
majority opinion.” 107  The judgement of the Court on the particular case together with 
individual opinions appended to this judgement form a common system. In that system the 
function of individual opinions is to provide information on the issues that the Court could not 
include in the judgement for the different objective reasons. The additional information might 
be necessary for comprehensive analysis of the judgement of the Court. Furthermore, the 
statement mentioned above indicates that the Court has a high level of confidence in the 
authority of its judgements. From that point of view the arguments included in individual 
opinions cannot diminish the authority of a judgement of the Court. This hypothesis is 
applicable both to dissenting and to separate opinions. Arguments which are stated in 
dissenting opinions also elucidates a judgement of the Court. The Court considers these 
arguments as a tool that might definitively convince the public that the Court’s majority did 
not make a mistake in its decision and the decision therefor has no flaws. The majority 
renders a particular decision considering all the arguments in individual opinions and, 
especially, in dissenting opinions. The majority decision could be considered not only in a 
sense as a legal document, but also as a mental process. From that point of view the majority 
decision could be regarded as based not only on the arguments which are included in a 
judgment. This decision is also based on the arguments which have been articulated in 
individual opinions but have been rejected by the majority during the deliberations. Thus, the 
judgement needs individual opinions because the arguments in individual opinions are so to 
speak part of the decision made by the majority. Without individual opinions it would be 
impossible to understand the judgement comprehensively.  
It worth noting that such an attitude towards individual opinions from the Court in its 
judgement leads to another conclusion. There is no bipolar system in the work of the Court in 
which individual opinions are diametrically opposed to the Court’s judgement. Individual 
opinions depend on the judgement of the Court because they cannot exist without the 
judgement. In reverse the judgement of the Court, inter alia, also depends on individual 
opinions. In a broad sense an individual opinion is a part of a judgement. The word “to 
attach” in the Article 95 of the Rules of the Court which provides that "Any judge may, if he 
so desires, attach his individual opinion to the judgment, whether he dissents from the 
majority or not”108 indirectly proves that idea. Therefore, in terms of this hypothesis there is 
no need for unanimity in the Court to act as a body. The Court as a body does not consider 
individual opinions as a threat to its authority. In the Court’s point of view the existence of 
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individual opinions on the contrary increases the authority of the Court’s judgement and, 
consequently, increases the authority of the Court itself.   
According to some scholars, individual opinions of judges ad hoc play a special role amongst 
other individual opinions while performing the function of interpretation or elucidation of a 
judgement, as these opinions: 
may be of a particular help for readers in situating the dispute at hand within the 
political and historical context of the States involved.
109
 
Indeed, judges ad hoc usually include in their individual opinion historical and political 
information on the State, by which they have been appointed. However, as it was pointed out 
in the previous chapter that the voting behavior of judges ad hoc is frequently based on the 
interests of the State, by which they were chosen. There are cases in which the only dissenting 
opinion was appended to the judgement by a judge ad hoc. Also, the study pointed out that 
the nature of the argumentation of dissenting opinions of judges ad hoc often has a form of a 
statement rather than an analysis.
110
 These individual opinions perform a mere informative 
function. Nevertheless, these individual opinions are useful in order to understand the position 
of the State that appointed the judge ad hoc. 
4.2 Do individual opinions in practice of the International Court of 
Justice contribute to the progressive development of 
international law? 
The provision of Article 59 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and 
then the provision of Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice has 
provided that the judgement of the Court has binding effect only between the parties and with 
regard to the particular case.
111
 However, there is a strong opinion amongst scholars and even 
individual judges of the Court that: “The development of international law was one of the 
main reasons for the creation of a permanent court of international justice.”112 And that: 
In fact, the practice of referring to its previous decisions has become one of the most 
conspicuous features of the Judgements and Opinions of the Court.
113
 
However, Article 38 of the Statute of the Court explicitly limits the right of the Court to use 
judicial decisions even as a subsidiary source of interpretation of international law.
114
 This 
approach of the Court is usually characterise as positivistic.
115
 The International Court of 
Justice often refers to its own jurisprudence by citing previous decisions and the decisions of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Nevertheless, the Court uses these decisions 
merely “to identify or elucidate a rule of law. Not to make such a rule.”116   As Judge 
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Shahabuddeen stated in his separate opinion in the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 case: “The 
Court is not committed to any doctrine of binding precedent, but it does respect its own 
jurisprudence.”117  
The absence of the doctrine of precedent in the work of the Court makes it more difficult to 
define whether individual opinions of judges of the Court have a direct influence on 
international law or somehow directly contribute to the development of international law. 
Nevertheless, the special role of individual opinions of judges of the Court in the international 
system of law has been noted since the establishment of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice. A member of the Committee of Jurists on the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in 1929, Sir Cecil had pointed out that: 
The views of distinguished judges who happened to be in a minority were as 
important to the building-up of an international system of law as the views of the 
majority.
118
  
It is undeniable that individual opinions as an instrument of the work of the judges of the 
International Court of Justice give more possibilities for the judges to express their views on 
the case than a judgement of the Court. The absence of a legal definition of individual 
opinions which could determine limits of the scope of individual opinions allows judges to 
develop their legal thoughts in respect to the matters of the case without any considerations 
about procedural requirements or consequences. The scope of individual opinions is not 
restricted by Articles 59 and Article 38 of the Statute of the Court. Other articles of the Statute 
do not regulate the scope of individual opinions also. Consequently, there are no statutory 
rules or requirements on the structure or the content of individual opinions. The freedom of 
expression which is limited only by the conscience of a judge is the obvious reason why 
individual opinions have become so valuable in determination of the direction of development 
of international law.  
In individual opinions judges often offer new approaches to the application of international 
law. A good example of the limitless development of legal thought can be found in the 
individual opinions of Judge Alvarez. In his individual opinions he had developed the theory 
of “a new international law”. Apart from that, he insisted on the Court’s competence to create 
law.
119
  
However, the Court is limited by Article 59 and Article 38 of its Statute. The direct influence 
of individual opinions on the application of international law could be established, for 
example, if the Court referred to individual opinions of judges in its judgements. Indeed, the 
Court has cited individual opinions in its judgements. For example, in the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project case the Court in the Judgement pointed out that one of the parties 
referred to “the principle of approximate application.”120 This principle has been articulated 
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by Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in his separate opinion
121
 in the Admissibility of Hearings of 
Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa case. However, the Court has rarely 
referred to individual opinions. Such references could be defined more as an exception than as 
the Court’s “practice”. Furthermore, the Court tends to follow its own jurisprudence in order 
not to decrease its authority. Although the conditions for change of the jurisprudence of the 
Court are not provided by internal documents of the Court one could assume that these 
conditions have a high threshold. It is not enough for the individual opinion to be well 
reasoned and persistent to change the jurisprudence of the Court. As Judge Shahabuddeen 
stated:  
And there should be public mischief, or something akin to it, in the sense that the 
injustice created by maintaining a previous but erroneous holding must decisively 
outweigh the injustice created by disturbing settled expectations based on the 
assumption of its continuance; mere marginal superiority of a new ruling should not 
suffice.
122
  
On the other hand, one could assume that there is such a phenomenon as “jurisprudence of 
individual opinions”. This jurisprudence is also respected by the judges of the Court and 
judges in their individual opinions frequently refer to “jurisprudence of individual opinions”. 
This hypothesis can be proved by analysis of references in individual opinions to ideas or 
principles of application of international law which were established in previous individual 
opinions of other judges. For example, in the Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to 
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament case, Judge Robinson in 
his dissenting opinion cited the separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice on another case: 
The requirement that there be a “dispute” is designed to ensure that what the Court is 
being asked to decide is susceptible to its authority and competence, or, as Judge 
Fitzmaurice in his separate opinion in Northern Cameroons said, the dispute must be 
“capable of engaging the judicial function of the Court.123 
With this statement Judge Robinson follows the approach of Judge Fitzmaurice in defining 
the criterion for a “dispute”. This approach obviously was not supported by the majority 
decision in either case. Consequently, the persistent application of the above mentioned 
criterion could possibly create the consistent “jurisprudence of individual opinions” on this 
issue.  
The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Onyeama, Dillard, Jiménez de Aréchaga and Sir 
Humphrey Waldock
124
 on the Judgement of the Court in the Nuclear Tests case also illustrates 
the hypothesis of the existence of “jurisprudence of individual opinions”. In this case the 
                                                 
121
 Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Rep. 1956 (June 1), p. 20. Separate opinion of Judge Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, p.46. 
122
 Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order, I.C.J. Rep. 1989 
.(Dec. 13), p. 132. Separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen p.158. 
123
 Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2016, p. 255 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Robinson. 
124
 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 253 Joint dissenting opinion of Judges 
Onyeama, Dillard, Jiménez de Aréchaga and Sir Humphrey Waldock. 
 35 
Court, inter alia, decided that although the applicant had requested a declaratory judgement, 
this was not the true object of a claim.
125
  The judges in the joint dissenting opinion opposed 
the statement of the Court by supporting their point of view with the statement of Judge 
Hudson in another case but on a related issue: 
In international litigation a request for a declaratory judgment is normally sufficient 
even when the Applicant's ultimate objective is to obtain the termination of certain 
conduct of the Respondent which it considers to be illegal. As Judge Hudson said in 
his individual opinion in the Diversion of Water from the Meuse case: ‘In 
international jurisprudence, however, sanctions are of a different nature and they play 
a different rôle, with the result that a declaratory judgment will frequently have the 
same compulsive force as a mandatory judgment; States are disposed to respect the 
one not less than the other.’ (P.C.I.J., Series AIB, No. 70, p. 79.)126 
In this joint dissenting opinion, the judges had also referred to several individual opinions in 
previous different cases of the Court apart from the individual opinion of Judge Hudson 
mentioned above.
127
    
Judge Koroma in his dissenting opinion in the Armed Activities case stated that there are 
different forms of establishing the jurisdiction of the Court and that: 
Among these is forum prorogatum, which was explained not long ago by Judge ad hoc 
Lauterpacht in his separate opinion in the Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
128
 
This statement also proves that when judges in their individual opinions refer to the content of 
previous individual opinions of other judges, they attach to that particular content some 
characteristics of the source of interpretation of international law. The views that has been 
expressed in individual opinions are used as a “quasi-precedent” in the system of individual 
opinions. 
However, the indirect contribution of individual opinions of judges of the Court to the 
development of international law is undeniable. The International Court of Justice as a 
principal judicial body in international adjudication by its jurisprudence naturally contributes 
to the development of international law, even though it might not create law by its practice:  
In the development of international law, the International Court of Justice plays a 
special role. The fifteen judges represent the world's principal legal systems and main 
forms of civilization. Each time they hand down a decision they make a definitive and 
authoritative impact on the development of law.
129
  
As it was discussed in the previous subchapter, individual opinions are an important part of 
the work of the Court, and of the Court’s decisions. The discussion on the arguments which 
are represented in individual opinions is part of the Court’s deliberation process and 
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eventually these arguments have a certain influence on the majority decision and contribute to 
that decision. Consequently, as individual opinions influence a judgement of the Court, they 
contribute to the development of international law. 
Accordingly, in conclusion individual opinions in the practice of the International Court of 
Justice do not directly contribute to the development of international law due to the fact that 
the Court is limited in the applicable sources of international law by the Article 38 and Article 
59 of its Statute but have indirectly provided a significant contribution to the development of 
international law and to ensuring the rule of law. On the one hand, individual opinions are 
part of a judgement since even from a formal point of view these opinions are the appendices 
of a judgement, on the other hand, individual opinions have no binding force and provide 
limitless freedom of expression for judges with respect to matters of the case. This dual nature 
of individual opinions allows them to influence on international law through the contribution 
to the judgement of the Court, “such opinions are evidence of the life and of the evolution of 
legal doctrine.”130  
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5 CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the thesis was to identify the actual role of the system of the individual 
opinions in the practice of the International Court of Justice and to propose possible solutions 
of strengthening the positive effect that this system has on the work of the International Court 
of Justice. 
The research and analyses performed in the thesis allowed to provide answers to the main 
questions of thesis: 
1. What are the practical and theoretical reasons for the divergent attitude towards the 
system of the individual opinions amongst the scholars and the judges of the International 
Court of Justice? 
In the author’s opinion there are two main reasons for divergent attitude towards the existence 
of the system of individual opinions in the International Court of Justice. The first reason is 
the absence of legal definition of individual opinions in the basic documents of the Court. The 
basic documents of the Court have certain inconsistences in respect to the provisions on 
individual opinions. The Statute of the Court, the Rules of the Court and other documents of 
the Court do not distinguish separate opinions from dissenting opinions, although, obviously, 
these are different types of individual opinions with different content. The scope of individual 
opinions is not defined in the basic documents of the Court either. This leads to a discussion 
inside the Court about possible limitation of the scope of individual opinions by the 
framework of the judgement of the Court. On the other hand, some judges of the Court have a 
theory that the freedom of expression of judges should not be restricted in any way. This 
discussion appears in declarations and individual opinions appended to judgements of the 
Court, consequently, the content of discussion is available for the general public. The fact that 
the Court has a disagreement on procedural aspects of its work decreases the authority of the 
Court in the eyes of the general public. The second reason derives from the first reason. The 
absence of the Court’s official endorsement of the system of individual opinions by means of 
the consistent regulation of this system in the basic documents of the Court leads to 
theoretical speculations on the issue of how this system decreases the authority of the Court. 
Academic community still discusses the possibility of the prohibition of the system of 
individual opinions. However, the results of the present research showed there are no 
discussions on how to improve the work of the system of individual opinions in practice.  
2.  Is there a correlation between the existence of the system of individual opinions and the 
diminishment of the Court’s authority? 
The present research showed that no statistically proven correlation can be established 
between the existence of the system of individual opinions and the diminishment of the 
Court’s authority. Furthermore, no practical correlation was established between the 
publication of individual opinions and probable violations of the secrecy of deliberations of 
the Court. Nevertheless, some negative aspects of publication of individual opinions 
appended to the advisory opinion of the Court were identified in the thesis. Due to the 
character of the advisory jurisdiction of the Court it seems to be unreasonable when all or 
almost all judges of the Court deliver a separate or dissenting opinion to the advisory opinion 
of the Court. This could be the issue for the further research.  
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3. Do individual opinions in practice of the International Court of Justice contribute to the 
progressive development of international law? 
In author’s opinion the distinguished line should be drawn between the direct and indirect 
impact of individual opinions on the progressive development of international law. The 
results of the analyses of the jurisprudence of the Court showed that individual opinions in 
practice do not and cannot directly contribute to the development of international law because 
the Court is limited in the applicable sources of international law by provisions of its Statute. 
On the other hand, the author defends the hypothesis that individual opinions form the part of 
the judgement of the Court. This hypothesis leads to the conclusion that individual opinions 
indirectly provide a significant contribution to the development of international law due to the 
fact that arguments of individual opinions are discussed during the Court’s deliberations and 
influence on the decision of the majority. Moreover, the author proposes that a phenomenon 
of consistent “jurisprudence of individual opinions” exists in the work of the Court. This 
jurisprudence is separate from the jurisprudence of the Court. This issue also could form the 
basis for the future research.  
4. What are the possible proposals on how to regulate the system of individual opinions in the 
basic documents of the International Court of Justice? 
The findings of the thesis suggest that for the progressive development of international law it 
is important to develop proper regulation for the system of individual opinions. The definition 
of individual opinions and provisions on the types of individual opinions should be included 
in the Rules of the Court. The question of the scope of individual opinions should be 
definitively resolved in order to prevent further speculations on how the content of individual 
opinions could decrease the authority of the Court. 
The results of the present research showed that the system of individual opinions in the 
International Court of Justice is understudied by scholars. There are only two main directions 
of the discussion about individual opinions in academic community: whether it is reasonable 
to prohibit the system of individual opinions (or some part of this system) or whether it is 
reasonable to keep the system. However, the system of individual opinions needs for deeper 
substantial research with the aims for possible directions of development of this system in 
order to insure the progressive development of international law. 
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